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Abstract
People often interact repeatedly: with relatives, through file sharing,
in politics, etc. Many such interactions are reciprocal: reacting to the
actions of the other. In order to facilitate decisions regarding reciprocal
interactions, we analyze the development of reciprocation over time. To
this end, we propose a model for such interactions that is simple enough
to enable formal analysis, but is sufficient to predict how such interactions
will evolve. Inspired by existing models of international interactions and
arguments between spouses, we suggest a model with two reciprocating
attitudes where an agent’s action is a weighted combination of the others’
last actions (reacting) and either i) her innate kindness, or ii) her own last
action (inertia). We analyze a network of repeatedly interacting agents,
each having one of these attitudes, and prove that their actions converge
to specific limits. Convergence means that the interaction stabilizes, and
the limits indicate the behavior after the stabilization. For two agents, we
describe the interaction process and find the limit values. For a general
connected network, we find these limit values if all the agents employ the
second attitude, and show that the agents’ actions then all become equal.
In the other cases, we study the limit values using simulations. We discuss
how these results predict the development of the interaction and can be
used to help agents decide on their behavior.
Keywords reciprocal interaction, agents, action, repeated reciprocation,
fixed, floating, behavior, network, convergence, Perron-Frobenius, convex com-
bination
1 Introduction
Interaction is central in human behavior, e.g., at school, in file sharing, in busi-
ness cooperation and political struggle. We aim at facilitating decision support
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for the interacting parties and for the outside observers. To this end, we want
to predict interaction.
Instead of being economically rational, people tend to adopt other ways of be-
havior [30, 35], not necessarily maximizing some utility function. Furthermore,
people tend to reciprocate, i.e., react on the past actions of others [15, 17, 21, 40].
Since reciprocation is ubiquitous, predicting it will allow predicting many real-
life interactions and advising on how to improve them. Therefore, we need
a model for reciprocating agents that is simple enough for analytical analysis
and precise enough to predict such interactions. Understanding such a model
would also help understanding how to improve personal and public good. This
is also important for engineering computer systems that fit human intuition of
reciprocity.
Extant models of (sometimes repeated) reciprocation can be classified as ex-
plaining existence or analyzing consequences. The following models consider the
reasons for existence of reciprocal tendencies, often incorporating evolutionary
arguments. The classical works of Axelrod [1, 2] considered discrete reciprocity
and showed that it is rational for egoists, so that species evolve to reciprocate.
Evolutionary explanation appears also in other places, such as [22, 39], or [5,
Chapter 6], the latter also explicitly considering the psychological aspects of
norm emergence. In [44], they consider pursuing fairness as a motivation for re-
ciprocation. In [3] and [18], they considered engendering reciprocation by both
the genetical kinship theory (helping relatives) and by the utility from cooper-
ating when the same pair of agents interact multiple times. The famous work
of Trivers [41] showed that sometimes reciprocity is rational, in much biological
detail, and thus, people can evolve to reciprocate. Gintis [19, Chapter 11] con-
sidered discrete actions, discussing not only the rationally evolved tit-for-tat,
but also reciprocity with no future interaction in sight, what he calls strong
reciprocity. He modeled the development of strong reciprocity. Several possible
reasons for strong reciprocity, such as a social part in the utility of the agents,
expressing itself in emotions, were considered in [16]. Berg et al. [4] proved
that people tend to reciprocate and considered possible motivations, such as
evolutionary stability. Reciprocal behavior was axiomatically motivated in [37],
assuming agents care not only for the outcomes, but also for strategies, thereby
pushed to reciprocate.
On another research avenue, Given that reciprocal tendencies exist, the fol-
lowing works analyzed what ways it makes interactions develop. Some models
analyzed reciprocal interactions by defining and analyzing a game where the
utility function of rational agents directly depends on showing reciprocation,
such as in [11, 14, 15, 29]. The importance of reward/punishment or of incom-
plete contracts for the flourishing of reciprocal individuals in the society was
shown in [17].
To summarize, reciprocity is seen as an inborn quality [16, 41], which has
probably been evolved from rationality of agents, as was shown by Axelrod [1].
As we have already said, understanding how a reciprocal interaction between
agents with various reciprocal inclinations uncurls with time will help explain
and predict the dynamics of reciprocal interaction, such as arms races and per-
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sonal relations. This would also be in the spirit of the call to consider various
repercussions of reciprocity from [27]. Since no analysis considers non-discrete
lengthy interaction, caused by inborn reciprocation, (unlike, say, the discrete
one from Axelrod [1, 2]), we model and study how reciprocity makes interaction
evolve with time.
We represent actions by weight, where a bigger value means a more desirable
contribution or, in the interpersonal context, investment in the relationship.
We model reciprocity by two reciprocation attitudes, an action’s weight being a
convex combination between i) one’s own kindness or ii) one’s own last action,
and the other’s and neighborhood’s last actions. The whole past should be
considered, but we assume that the last actions represent the history enough, to
facilitate analysis. Defining an action (or how much it changes) or a state by a
linear combination of the other side’s actions and own actions and qualities was
also used to analyze arms race [13, 45] and spouses’ interaction [20] (piecewise
linear in this case). Attitude i) depending on the (fixed) kindness is called fixed,
and ii) depending on one’s own last action is called floating. Given this model,
we study its behavioral repercussions.
There are several reminiscent but different models. The floating model re-
sembles opinions that converge to a consensus [7, 26, 42, 12], while the fixed
model resembles converging to a general equilibrium of opinions [6]. Of course,
unlike the models of spreading opinions, we consider different actions on various
neighbors, determined by direct reaction and a reaction to the whole neighbor-
hood. Still, because of some technical reminiscence to some of our models, we
do use those for one of our proofs. Another similar model is that of monotonic
concession [33] and that of bargaining over dividing a pie [34]. The main differ-
ence is that in those models, the agents decide what to do, while in our case,
they follow the reciprocation formula.
Example 1. Consider n colleagues 1, 2, . . . , n, who can help or harm each other.
Let the possible actions be: giving bad work, showing much contempt, showing
little contempt, supporting emotionally a little, supporting emotionally a lot,
advising, and let their respective weight be a point in [−1,−0.5), [−0.5,−0.2),
[−0.2.0), (0, 0.4), [0.4, 0.7), [0.7, 1]. Assume that each person knows what the
other did to him last time. The social climate, meaning what the whole group
did, also influences behavior. However, we may just concentrate on a single pair
of even-tempered colleagues who reciprocate regardless the others.
To understand and predict reciprocal behavior, we look at the limit of time
approaching infinity, since this describes what actions will take place from some
time on. We first consider two agents in Section 3, assuming their interaction
is independent of other agents, or that the total influence of the others on the
pair is negligible. This assumption allows for deeper a theoretical analysis of the
interaction than in the general case. The values in the limit for two agents will
be also implied by a general convergence result that is presented later, unless
both agents are fixed. We still present them with the other results for two
agents for the completeness of Section 3. Section 5 studies interaction of many
agents, where the techniques we used for two agents are not applicable, and we
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show exponentially fast convergence. Exponential convergence means a rapid
stabilizing, and it explains acquiring personal behavioral styles, which is often
seen in practice [32]. We find the limit when all the agents act synchronously
and at most one has the fixed reciprocation attitude. Among other things, we
prove that when at most one agent is fixed, the limits of the actions of all agents
are the same, explaining formation of organizational subcultures, known in the
literature [24]. We also find that only the kindness values of the fixed agents
influence the limits of the various actions, thereby explaining that persistence
(i.e., being faithful to one’s inner inclination) makes interaction go one’s own
way, which is reflected in daily life in the recommendations to reject undesired
requests by firmly repeating the reasons for rejection [8, Chapter 1] and [43,
Chapter 8]. Other cases are simulated in Section 6. These results describe the
interaction process and lay the foundation for further analysis of interaction.
The major contributions are proving convergence and finding its limits for
at most one fixed agent or for two agents. These allow to explain the above
mentioned phenomena and predict reciprocation. The predictions can assist in
deciding whether a given interaction will be profitable, and in engineering more
efficient multi-agent systems, fitting the reciprocal intuition of the users.
2 Modeling Reciprocation
2.1 Basic
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be n ≥ 2 interacting agents. We assume that possible
actions are described by an undirected interaction graph G = (N,E), such that
agent i acts on j and vice versa if and only if (i, j) ∈ E. Denote the degree
of agent i ∈ N in G by d(i). This allows for various topologies, including
heterogeneous ones, like those in [36]. To be able to mention directed edges,
we shall treat this graph as a directed one, where for every (i, j) ∈ E, we have
(j, i) ∈ E. Time is modeled by a set of discrete moments t ∈ T ∆= {0, 1, 2, . . .},
defining a time slot whenever at least one agent acts. Agent i acts at times
Ti
∆
= {ti,0 = 0, ti,1, ti,2, . . .} ⊆ T , and ∪i∈NTi = T . We assume that all agents
act at t = 0, since otherwise we cannot sometimes consider the last action of
another agent, which would force us to complicate the model and render it
even harder for theoretical analysis. When all agents always act at the same
times (T1 = T2 = . . . = Tn = T ), we say they act synchronously.
For the sake of asymptotic analysis, we assume that each agent gets to act
an infinite number of times; that is, Ti is infinite for every i ∈ N . Any real
application will, of course, realize only a finite part of it, and infinity models
the unboundedness of the process in time.
When (i, j) is in E, we denote the weight of an action by agent i ∈ N on
another agent j ∈ N at moment t by acti,j(t) : Ti → R. We extend acti,j to T
by assuming that at t ∈ T \ Ti, we have acti,j(t) = 0. Since only the weight of
an action is relevant, we usually write “action” while referring to its weight. For
example, when interacting by file sharing, sending a valid piece of a file, nothing,
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or a piece with a virus has a positive, zero, or a negative weight, respectively.
For t ∈ T , we define the last action time si(t) : T → Ti of agent i as the
largest t′ ∈ Ti that is at most t. Since 0 ∈ Ti, this is well defined. The
last action of agent i on (another) agent j is given by xi,j(t)
∆
= acti,j(si(t)).
Thus, we have defined xi,j(t) : T → R, and we use mainly this concept xi,j in
the paper. We denote the total received contribution from all the neighbors
N(i) at their last action times not later than t by goti(t) : T → R; formally,
goti(t)
∆
=
∑
j∈N(i) xj,i(t).
We now define two reciprocation attitudes, which define how an agent re-
ciprocates. We need the following notions. The kindness of agent i is denoted
by ki ∈ R; w.l.o.g., kn ≥ . . . ≥ k2 ≥ k1 throughout the paper. Kindness models
inherent inclination to help others; in particular, it determines the first action
of an agent, before others have acted. We model agent i’s inclination to mimic
a neighboring agent’s action and the actions of the whole neighborhood in G
by reciprocation coefficients ri ∈ [0, 1] and r′i ∈ [0, 1] respectively, such that
ri + r
′
i ≤ 1. Here, ri is the fraction of xi,j(t) that is determined by the last
action of j upon i, and r′i is the fraction that is determined by
1
|N(i)| th of the
total contribution to i from all the neighbors at the last time.
2.2 Reciprocation
Intuitively, the fixed attitude depends on the agent’s kindness at every action,
while the floating one is loose, moving freely in the reciprocation process, and
kindness directly influences such behavior only at t = 0. In both cases xi,j(0)
∆
=
ki.
Definition 1. For the fixed reciprocation attitude, agent i’s reaction on the
other agent j and on the neighborhood is determined by the agent’s kindness
weighted by 1 − ri − r′i, by the other agent’s action weighted by ri and by the
total action of the neighbors weighted by r′i and divided over all the neighbors:
That is, for t ∈ Ti, acti,j(t) = xi,j(t) ∆=
(1− ri − r′i) · ki + ri · xj,i(t− 1) + r′i ·
goti(t− 1)
|N(i)| .
Definition 2. In the floating reciprocation attitude, agent i’s action is a
weighted average of her own last action, of that of the other agent j and of
the total action of the neighbors divided over all the neighbors: To be precise,
for t ∈ Ti, acti,j(t) = xi,j(t) ∆=
(1− ri − r′i) · xi,j(t− 1) + ri · xj,i(t− 1) + r′i ·
goti(t− 1)
|N(i)| .
The relations are (usually inhomogeneous) linear recurrences with constant
coefficients. We could express the dependence xi,j(t) only on xi,j(t
′) with t′ < t,
but then the coefficients would not be constant, besides the case of two fixed
agents. We are not aware of a method to use the general recurrence theory to
improve our results.
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2.3 Clarifications
Compared to the other models, our model takes reciprocal actions as given
and looks at the process, while other models either consider how reciprocation
originates, such as the evolutionary model of Axelrod [1], or take it as given and
consider specific games, such as in [11, 14, 15, 29].
In Example 1, let (just here) n = 3 and the reciprocation coefficients
be r1 = r2 = 0.5, r
′
1 = r
′
2 = 0.3, r3 = 0.8, r
′
3 = 0.1. Assume the kindness
to be k1 = 0, k2 = 0.5 and k3 = 1. Since this is a small group, all the
colleagues may interact, so the graph is a clique1. At t = 0, every agent’s
action on every other agent is equal to her kindness value, so agent 1 does
nothing, agent 2 supports emotionally a lot, and 3 provides advice. If all
agents act synchronously, meaning T1 = T2 = T3 = {0, 1, . . .} , and all get
carried away by the process, meaning that they forget the kindness in the
sense of employing floating reciprocation, then, at t = 1 they act as follows:
x1,2(1) = (1− 0.5− 0.3) · 0 + 0.5 · 0.5 + 0.3 · 0.5+12 = 0.475 (supports emotionally
a lot), x1,3(1) = (1−0.5−0.3) ·0 + 0.5 ·1 + 0.3 · 0.5+12 = 0.975 (provides advice),
x2,1(1) = (1− 0.5− 0.3) · 0.5 + 0.5 · 0 + 0.3 · 0+12 = 0.25 (supports emotionally a
little), and so on.
Consider modeling tit for tat [2]:
Example 2. In our model, the tit for tat with two options, - cooperate or
defect, is easily modeled with ri = 1, ki = 1, meaning that the original action
is cooperating (1) and the next action is the current action of the other player.
Since we consider a mechanism, rather than a game, the agents will always
cooperate. If one agent begins with cooperation (k1 = 1) and the other one with
defection (k2 = 0), acting synchronously, then they will alternate.
The notation is summarized in Table 1.
3 Pairwise Interaction
We now consider an interaction of two agents, 1 and 2, since this assumption
allows proving much more than we will be able to in the general case. The model
reduces to a pairwise interaction, when r′i = 0 or when there are no neighbors
besides the other agent in the considered pair. We assume both, w.l.o.g. Since
agent 1 can only act on agent 2 and vice versa, we write acti(t) for acti,j(t),
x(t) for x1,2(t) and y(t) for x2,1(t).
We analyze the case of both agents being fixed, then the case of the floating,
and then the case where one is fixed and the other one is floating. To formally
discuss the actions after the interaction has stabilized, we consider the limits (if
exist)2 limp→∞ act1(t1,p), and limt→∞ x(t), for agent 1, and limp→∞ act2(t2,p)
and limt→∞ y(t) for agent 2. Since the sequence {x(t)} is {act1(t1,p)} with finite
repetitions, the limit limt→∞ x(t) exists if and only if limp→∞ act1(t1,p) does. If
1A clique is a fully connected graph.
2Agent i acts at the times in Ti = {ti,0 = 0, ti,1, ti,2, . . .}.
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Term: Meaning:
acti,j(t) : T →
R
The action of i on another agent j at time t.
Ti The time moments when agent i acts.
Synchronous T1 = T2 = . . . = Tn.
si(t) : T → Ti max {t′ ∈ Ti|t′ ≤ t}.
xi,j(t) : T →
R
acti,j(si(t)).
goti(t) : T →
R
∑
j∈N(i) xj,i(t).
ki The kindness of agent i.
ri, r
′
i ∈
[0, 1], ri+r
′
i ≤
1
The reciprocation coefficients of agent i.
Agent i has
the fixed
reciprocation
attitude, j
is another
agent
At moment t ∈ Ti,
xi,j(t)
∆
=

(1− ri − r′i) · ki + ri · xj,i(t− 1)
+r′i · goti(t−1)|N(i)| t > ti,0
ki t = ti,0 = 0.
Agent i has
the floating
reciprocation
attitude, j
is another
agent
At moment t ∈ Ti,
xi,j(t)
∆
=

(1− ri − r′i) · xi,j(t− 1)
+ri · xj,i(t− 1) + r′i · goti(t−1)|N(i)| t > ti,0
ki t = ti,0 = 0.
Table 1: The notation used throughout the paper.
they exist, they are equal; the same holds for limt→∞ y(t) and limp→∞ act2(t2,p).
Denote Lx
∆
= limt→∞ x(t) and Ly
∆
= limt→∞ y(t).
3.1 Fixed Reciprocation
Here we prove that both action sequences converge.
Theorem 1. If the reciprocation coefficients are not both 1, which means r1r2 <
1, then we have, for i ∈ N : limp→∞ acti(ti,p) = (1−ri)ki+ri(1−rj)kj1−rirj .
The assumption that not both reciprocation coefficients are 1 and the similar
assumptions in the following theorems (such as 1 > ri > 0) mean that the agent
neither ignores the other’s action, nor does it copy the other’s action. These
are to be expected in real life. In Example 1, if agents 1 and 2 employ fixed
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reciprocation, r1 = r2 = 0.5, r
′
1 = r
′
2 = 0.0 and k1 = 0, k2 = 0.5, then we obtain
Lx =
0.5·(1−0.5)0.5
1−0.5·0.5 = 1/6 and Ly =
(1−0.5)·0.5
1−0.5·0.5 = 1/3.
In order to prove this theorem, we first show that it is sufficient to analyze
the synchronous case, i.e., T1 = T2 = T .
Lemma 1. Consider a pair of interacting agents. Denote the action se-
quences in case both agents acted at the same time, (i.e., T1 = T2 =
T ), by {x′(t)}t∈T and {y′(t)}t∈T , respectively. Then the action sequences3
{act1(t1,p)}p∈N , {act2(t2,p)}p∈N are subsequences of {x′(t)}t∈T and {y′(t)}t∈T ,
respectively.
The proof follows from Definition 1 by induction. (Straightforward proofs
in this paper have been replaced by their general ideas due to lack of space).
Using this lemma, it is sufficient to further assume the synchronous case.
Lemma 2. In the synchronous case, for every t > 0 : x(2t−1) ≥ x(2t+1), and
for every t ≥ 0 : x(2t) ≤ x(2t+ 2) ≤ x(2t+ 1). By analogy, ∀t > 0 : y(2t− 1) ≤
y(2t + 1), and ∀t ≥ 0 : y(2t) ≥ y(2t + 2) ≥ y(2t + 1). All the inequations are
strict if and only if 0 < r1, r2 < 1, k2 > k1.
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Since we also have t ≥ 0 : x(2t) ≤ x(2t + 1), we obtain t > 0 : x(2t − 1) ≥
x(2t+1) ≥ x(2t), and for every t ≥ 0 : x(2t) ≤ x(2t+2) ≤ x(2t+1). By analogy,
∀t > 0 : y(2t−1) ≤ y(2t+ 1) ≤ y(2t), and ∀t ≥ 0 : y(2t) ≥ y(2t+ 2) ≥ y(2t+ 1).
Intuitively, this means that the sequence {x(t)} is alternating while its amplitude
is getting smaller, and the same holds for the sequence {y(t)}, with another
alternation direction. The intuitive reasons are that first, agent 1 increases her
action, while 2 decreases it. Then, since 2 has decreased her action, so does 1,
while since 1 has increased hers, so does 2. We now prove the lemma.
Proof. We employ induction. For t = 0, we need to show that x(0) ≤ x(2) ≤
x(1) and y(0) ≥ y(2) ≥ y(1). We know that x(0) = k1, x(1) = (1 − r1) ·
k1 + r1 · k2, and y(0) = k2, y(1) = (1 − r2) · k2 + r2 · k1. Since y(1) ≤ k2,
we have x(2) = (1 − r1) · k1 + r1 · y(1) ≤ x(1). Since y(1) ≥ k1, we also have
x(2) = (1− r1) · k1 + r1 · y(1) ≥ x(0). The proof for ys is analogous.
For the induction step, for any t > 0, assume that the lemma holds for t−1,
which means x(2t − 3) ≥ x(2t − 1) (for t > 1), x(2t − 2) ≤ x(2t) ≤ x(2t − 1),
and y(2t− 3) ≤ y(2t− 1) (for t > 1), y(2t− 2) ≥ y(2t) ≥ y(2t− 1).
We now prove the lemma for t. By Definition 1, x(2t − 1) = (1 − r1)k1 +
r1y(2t − 2) and x(2t + 1) = (1 − r1)k1 + r1y(2t). Since y(2t − 2) ≥ y(2t), we
have x(2t− 1) ≥ x(2t+ 1). By analogy, we can prove that y(2t− 1) ≤ y(2t+ 1).
Also by definition, x(2t) = (1 − r1)k1 + r1y(2t − 1) and x(2t + 2) = (1 −
r1)k1 + r1y(2t+ 1). Since y(2t− 1) ≤ y(2t+ 1), we have x(2t) ≤ x(2t+ 2). By
definition, x(2t+ 1) = (1− r1)k1 + r1y(2t). Since y(2t) ≥ y(2t−1), we conclude
that x(2t + 1) ≥ x(2t). By analogy, we prove that y(2t + 1) ≤ y(2t). From
3Agent i acts at the times in Ti = {ti,0 = 0, ti,1, ti,2, . . .}.
4We always assume that k2 ≥ k1.
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this, we conclude that x(2t + 2) ≤ x(2t + 1), and we have shown that x(2t) ≤
x(2t+ 2) ≤ x(2t+ 1). By analogy, we prove that y(2t) ≥ y(2t+ 2) ≥ y(2t+ 1).
The equivalence of strictness in all the inequations to 0 < r1, r2 < 1, k2 > k1
is proven by repeating the proof with strict inequalities in one direction, and by
noticing that not having one of the conditions 0 < r1, r2 < 1, k2 > k1 implies
equality in at least one of the statements of the lemma.
With these results we now prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Using Lemma 1, we assume the synchronous case. We first prove conver-
gence, and then find its limit. For each agent, Lemma 2 implies that the even
actions form a monotone sequence, and so do the odd ones. Both sequences
are bounded, which can be easily proven by induction, and therefore each one
converges. The whole sequence converges if and only if both limits are the same.
We now show that they are indeed the same for the sequence {x(t)}; the proof
for {y(t)} is analogous. x(t+ 1)− x(t)
= (1− r1)k1 + r1y(t)− (1− r1)k1 − r1y(t− 1)
= r1(y(t)− y(t− 1)) = r1r2(x(t− 1)− x(t− 2)) = . . .
= (r1r2)
bt/2c
{
x(1)− x(0) t = 2s, s ∈ N
x(2)− x(1) t = 2s+ 1, s ∈ N. As r1r2 < 1, this difference goes
to 0 as t goes to ∞. Thus, x(t) converges (and so does y(t)). To find the lim-
its Lx = limt→∞ x(t) and Ly = limt→∞ y(t), notice that in the limit we have
(1 − r1)k1 + r1Ly = Lx and (1 − r2)k2 + r2Lx = Ly with the unique solution:
Lx =
(1−r1)k1+r1(1−r2)k2
1−r1r2 and Ly =
(1−r2)k2+r2(1−r1)k1
1−r1r2 .
We see that Lx ≤ Ly, which is intuitive, since the agents are always con-
sidering their kindness, so the kinder one acts with a bigger weight also in the
limit. In the simulation of the actions over time in Figure 1, on the left, y(t)
is always larger than x(t), and on the right, they alternate several times before
y(t) becomes larger.
3.2 Floating Reciprocation
If both agents have the floating reciprocation attitude, their action sequences
converge to a common limit.
Theorem 2. If 0 < r1 + r2 < 2, then, as t→∞, x(t) and y(t) converge to the
same limit. In the synchronous case (T1 = T2 = T ), they both approach
1
2
(
k1 + k2 + (k2 − k1)r1 − r2
r1 + r2
)
=
r2
r1 + r2
k1 +
r1
r1 + r2
k2.
The common limit of the actions is shown in Figure 2.
In Example 1, if agents 1 and 2 employ fixed reciprocation, r1 = r2 =
0.5, r′1 = r
′
2 = 0.0 and k1 = 0, k2 = 0.5, then we obtain Lx = Ly = (1/2) · 0 +
(1/2) · 0.5 = 0.25.
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Figure 1: Simulation of actions for
the synchronous case, with r1 + r2 <
1, r2 = 0.5 on the left, and r1+r2 > 1,
r2 = 0.9 on the right. This is a fixed -
fixed reciprocation, with k1 = 1, k2 =
2, r1 = 0.3. Each agent’s oscillate,
while converging to her own limit.
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Figure 2: The common limit of the
actions as a function of the reciprocity
coefficients, for a Floating - floating
reciprocation, k1 = 1, k2 = 2. Given
r2, agent 1 receives most when r1 = 1,
and given r1, agent 2 receives most
when r2 = 0.
The idea of the proof is to show that {[min {x(t), y(t)} ,max {x(t), y(t)}]}∞t=1
is a nested sequence of segments, which lengths approach zero, and therefore,
{x(t)} and {y(t)} converge to the same limit. Finding this limit stems from
finding limt→∞ (x(t) + y(t)).
3.3 Fixed and Floating Reciprocation
Assume that agent 1 employs the fixed reciprocation attitude, while 2 acts by
the floating reciprocation. We can show Theorem 3 using the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If r2 > 0 and r1 + r2 ≤ 1, then, for every t ≥ t1,1 : x(t+ 1) ≤ x(t),
and for every t ≥ 0 : y(t+ 1) ≤ y(t).
The proof is by induction on t, using the definitions of reciprocation. With
this lemma, we can prove the following.
Theorem 3. If r2 > 0 and r1 + r2 ≤ 1, then, limt→∞ x(y) = limt→∞ y(t) = k1.
Proof. We first prove that the convergence takes place, and then find its limit.
For each agent, Lemma 3 implies that her actions are monotonically non-
increasing. Since the actions are bounded below by k1, which can be easily
proven by induction, they both converge.
To find the limits, notice that in the limit we have
(1− r1)k1 + r1Ly = Lx (1)
(1− r2)Ly + r2Lx = Ly. (2)
From Eq. (2), we conclude that Lx = Ly, since r2 > 0. Substituting this to
Eq. (1) gives us Lx = Ly = k1, since r2 > 0 and r1 + r2 ≤ 1 imply r1 < 1.
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Figure 3: Simulation of actions for the synchronous case, with r1 + r2 < 1,
r2 = 0.5 on the left, and r1 + r2 > 1, r2 = 0.9 on the right. This is a fixed -
floating reciprocation, with k1 = 1, k2 = 2, r1 = 0.3. In the left graph, agent
1’s actions are smaller than those of 2; agent 1’s actions decrease after t = 1,
while those of agent 2 decrease all the time. The common limits’ value fits the
theorem’s prediction.
The relation between the sequences of xs and ys is given by the following
proposition (also covering the case r1 + r2 ≥ 1).
Proposition 1. If r1 + r2 ≤ 1, then for every t ≥ 0 : y(t) ≥ x(t). If r1 +
r2 ≥ 1, then y(0) ≥ x(0). For every t > 0 such that t ∈ T1 ∩ T2, we have
y(t − 1) ≤ x(t − 1) ⇒ y(t) ≥ x(t). For any t ∈ T1 \ T2, we have y(t) ≥ x(t),
and for any t ∈ T2 \ T1, we have y(t − 1) ≥ x(t − 1) ⇒ y(t) ≥ x(t), and
y(t− 1) ≤ x(t− 1)⇒ y(t) ≤ x(t).
The proof employs induction on t.
We note that although we have not seen yet whether Theorem 3 holds for
r1 + r2 > 1, we know that neither monotonicity (Lemma 3) nor y(t) being
always at least as large as x(t) or the other way around holds in this case.
As a counterexample for both of them, consider the case of r2 = 1, 0 < r1 <
1, k2 > k1. One can readily prove by induction that for all t we have x(2t+1) >
x(2t) = x(2t + 2) and y(2t) > y(2t − 1) = y(2t + 1), and thus both sequences
are not monotonic. In addition, one can inductively prove that x(2t + 1) >
y(2t + 1), x(2t) < y(2t), and therefore no sequence is always larger than the
other one.
Figure 3 shows how the actions evolve over time. The actions seem to con-
verge also in the unproven case r1 + r2 > 1.
In the case of the mirroring assumption that agent 1 acts according to the
floating reciprocation attitude, while 2 acts according to the fixed reciprocation,
we can obtain similar results, which are omitted due to lack of space.
For all the considered cases, we have the following
Proposition 2. If both Lx and Ly exist, then Lx ≤ Ly.
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4 Alternating Case
We consider the interaction of two agents, 1 and 2. Some of the statements in
the paper refer only to the synchronous case (T1 = T2 = T ). All of them can be
updated for the alternating case (T1 contains precisely all the even times and
T2 contains zero and all the odd ones).
Theorem 2 can be extended as follows:
Theorem 4. In the case where agents act alternately, which is when T1 contains
precisely all the even times and T2 contains zero and all the odd ones, they both
approach
1
2
(
k1 + k2 +
(r1 − r2 − r1r2)
r1 + r2 − r1r2 (k2 − k1)
)
=
r2
r1 + r2 − r1r2 k1 +
r1 − r1r2
r1 + r2 − r1r2 k2.
The idea of the proof is proving that x(t) + y(t) approach k1 + k2 +
(r1−r2−r1r2)
r1+r2−r1r2 (k2 − k1).
5 Multi-Agent Interaction
We now analyze the general interdependent interaction, when agents inter-
act with many agents. To formally discuss the actions after the interaction
has settled down, we consider the limits (if exist)5 limp→∞ acti,j(t1,p), and
limt→∞ xi,j(t), for agents i and j. Since the sequence {xi,j(t)} is {acti,j(t1,p)}
with finite repetitions, the limit limp→∞ acti,j(t1,p) exists if and only if
limt→∞ xi,j(t) does. If they exist, they are equal. Denote Li,j
∆
= limt→∞ xi,j(t).
We first provide general convergence results, and then we find the common
limit for the case when at most one agent is fixed and synchronous in Theorem 6.
We finally use simulations to analyze the limits in other cases. In this section,
the ambivalent case of ri + r
′
i = 1 is taken to be floating.
First, we have convergence for the case of floating agents.
Proposition 3. Consider a connected interaction graph, where all agents are
floating and for every agent i, ri + r
′
i < 1. Then, for all pairs of agents i 6= j
such that (i, j) ∈ E, the limit Li,j exists; all these limits are equal to each other.
Proof. Follows directly from [7, Theorem 2]. This article and similar articles on
multiagent coordination [26, 42] prove convergence when all agents are floating.
We now show convergence, when some agents are fixed.
5Agent i acts at the times in Ti = {ti,0 = 0, ti,1, ti,2, . . .}.
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Proposition 4. Consider a connected interaction graph, where for all agents
i, r′i > 0. Assume that at least one agent employs the fixed attitude and every
agent acts at least once every q times, for a natural q > 0. Then, for all pairs
of agents i 6= j such that (i, j) ∈ E, the limit Li,j exists. The convergence is
geometrically fast.
Proof. We express how each action depends on the actions in the previous time
in matrix A(t) ∈ R|E|×|E|+ , which, in the synchronous case, is defined as follows:
A(t)((i, j), (k, l))
∆
=

(1− ri − r′i) if k = i, l = j;
ri + r
′
i
1
|N+(i)| if k = j, l = i;
r′i
1
|N+(i)| if k 6= j, l = i;
0 otherwise,
(3)
where the first line is missing for the fixed agents, since for them, own behavior
does not matter. If, for each time t ∈ T , the column vector ~p(t) ∈ R|E|+ describes
the actions at time t, in the sense that its (i, j)th coordinate contains xi,j(t) (for
(i, j) ∈ E), then we have ~p(t + 1) = A(t + 1)~p(t) + ~k′, where ~k′ is the relevant
kindness vector, formally defined as
k′(t)((i, j)) ∆=
{
(1− ri − r′i)ki if i is fixed ;
0 otherwise.
In a not necessarily synchronous case, only a subset of agents act at a given
time t. For an acting agent i, every A(t)((i, j), (k, l)) is defined as in the syn-
chronous case. For a non-acting agent i, we define
A(t)((i, j), (k, l))
∆
=
{
1 if k = i, l = j;
0 otherwise.
(4)
The kindness vector is defined as
k′(t)((i, j)) ∆=
{
(1− ri − r′i)ki if i is fixed and acting;
0 otherwise.
By induction, we obtain ~p(t) =
∏t
t′=1A(t
′)~p(0) +∑
~k′∈K
{(∑
l∈S~k′ (t)
∏t
t′=lA(t
′)
)
~k′
}
, where K is the set of all possible
kindness vectors and S~k′(t) is a set of the appearance times of
~k′, which are at
most t.
We aim to show that ~p(t) converges. First, defining ri(M) to be the sum of
the ith row of M , note [9, Eq. 3], namely
ri(AB) =
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
ai,jbj,k =
n∑
j=1
ai,jrj(B). (5)
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Since the sum of every row in any A(t) is at most 1, we conclude that if B ≤ βC,
Ci,j ≡ 1, then also A(t)B ≤ βC.
We now prove that an upper bound of the form βC on the entries of∏q
t=pA(t) converges to zero geometrically. We have just shown that this bound
never increases. First, A(p) ≤ C, yielding the bound in the beginning. Now,
let i be a fixed agent, and assume he acts at time t. Thus, each row in A(t)
which relates to the edges entering i sums to less than 1, and from Eq. (5) we
gather that the upper bound on the appropriate rows in A(t)B decreases rela-
tively to the bound on B by some constant ratio. Since the graph is connected,
for all agents i, r′i > 0, and every agent acts every q times, we will have, after
enough multiplications, that the bound on all the entries will have decreased by
a constant ratio.
Every agent acts at least once every q times, so we gather that for some
q′ > 0, every q′ times, the product of matrices becomes at most a given frac-
tion of the product q′ times before. This implies a geometric convergence of∏t
t′=1A(t
′). As for
∑
l∈S~k′ (t)
∏t
t′=lA(t
′), we have proven an exponential upper
bound, thus
∑
l∈S~k′ (t)
∏t
t′=lA(t
′) ≤ ∑l∈S~k′ (t) α
[
t−l+1
q′
]
C ≤ ∑l∈S~k′ (t) α t−lq′ C =
α
t
q′
(∑
l∈S~k′ (t)
α
−l
q′
)
C
≤
geom. seq. α
t
q′ −1
α
1
q′ −1
C, proving a geometric convergence of
the series
∑
l∈S~k′ (t)
∏t
t′=lA(t
′). Therefore, ~p(t) converges, and it does so geo-
metrically fast.
As an immediate conclusion of this proposition, we can finally generalize
Theorem 3 to the case r1 + r2 > 1 as follows.
Corollary 5. Consider pairwise interaction, where one agent i employs fixed
reciprocation and the other agent j employs the floating one, and every agent
acts at least once every q times. Assume that 0 < ri < 1 and rj > 0. Then,
both limits exist and are equal to ki. The convergence is geometrically fast.
Proof. Proposition 4 implies geometrically fast convergence. We find the limits
as in the proof of Theorem 3.
We now turn to finding the limit. We manage to do this only in the syn-
chronous case, when all the agents are floating or all the fixed agents have
the same kindness. For all reciprocation attitudes, the following theorem also
provides an alternative proof of convergence in the synchronous case.
Theorem 6. Given a connected interaction graph, consider the synchronous
case where for all agents i, r′i > 0. If there exists a cycle of an odd length in the
graph (or at least one agent i employs floating reciprocation and has ri+r
′
i < 1),
then, for all pairs of agents i 6= j such that (i, j) ∈ E, the limit Li,j exists and
it is a positive combination of all the kindness values of the agents who are
fixed, if at least one agent is fixed, and of all the kindness values k1, . . . , kn,
if all agents are floating. The convergence is geometrically fast. Moreover, if
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all agents employ floating reciprocation, then all these limits are equal to each
other and it is a convex combination of the kindness values, namely
L =
∑
i∈N
(
d(i)
ri+r′i
· ki
)
∑
i∈N
(
d(i)
ri+r′i
) . (6)
If, on the other hand, all the fixed agents have the same kindness k, then all
these limits are equal to k. In any case, when not all the agents are floating,
then changing only the kindness of the floating agents leaves all the limits as
before (also follows from the limits being positive combinations of all the kindness
values of the agents who are fixed).
Let us say several words about the assumptions. If all agents are fixed, we
can prove that the actions are subsequences of the actions in the synchronous
case (a straightforward generalization of Lemma 1.) Thus, the synchronous case
represents all the cases in the limit, when all agents are fixed. The assumption
of a cycle of an odd length virtually always holds, since three people influencing
each other form such a cycle.
Proof. We first prove the case where all agents use floating reciprocation. We
express how each action depends on the actions in the previous time in a matrix,
and prove the theorem by applying the famous Perron–Frobenius theorem [38,
Theorem 1.1, 1.2] to this matrix. We now define the dynamics matrix A ∈
R|E|×|E|+ :
A((i, j), (k, l))
∆
=

(1− ri − r′i) if k = i, l = j;
ri + r
′
i
1
|N+(i)| if k = j, l = i;
r′i
1
|N+(i)| if k 6= j, l = i;
0 otherwise.
(7)
According to the definition of floating reciprocation, if for each time t ∈ T the
column vector ~p(t) ∈ R|E|+ describes the actions at time t, in the sense that its
(i, j)th coordinate contains xi,j(t) (for (i, j) ∈ E), then ~p(t + 1) = A~p(t). We
then call ~p(t) an action vector. Initially, ~p(i,j)(0) = ki.
Further, we shall need to use the Perron–Frobenius theorem for primitive
matrices. We now prepare to use it, and first we show that A is primitive.
First, A is irreducible since we can move from any (i, j) ∈ E to any (k, l) ∈ E
as follows. We can move from an action to its reverse, since if k = j, l = i,
then A((i, j), (k, l)) = ri + r
′
i
1
|N+(i)| > 0. We can also move from an action to
another action by the same agent, since we can move to any action on the same
agent and then to its reverse. To move to an action on the same agent, notice
that if l = i, then A((i, j), (k, l)) ≥ r′i 1|N+(i)| > 0. Now, we can move from any
action (i, j) to any other action (k, l) by moving to the reverse action (j, i) (if
k = j, l = i, we are done). Then, follow a path from j to k in graph G by
moving to the appropriate action by an agent and then to the reverse, as many
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times as needed till we are at the action (k, j) and finally to the action (k, l).
Thus, A is irreducible.
By definition, A is non-negative. A is aperiodic, since either at least one
agent i has ri + ri < 1, and thus the diagonal contains non-zero elements,
or there exists a cycle of an odd length in the interaction graph G. In the
latter case, let the cycle be i1, i2, . . . , ip for an odd p. Consider the follow-
ing cycles on the index set of the matrix: (i, j), (j, i), (i, j) for any (i, j) ∈ E
and (i2, i1), (i3, i2), . . . , (ip, ip−1), (i1, ip), (i2, i1). Their lengths are 2 and p, re-
spectively, which greatest common divisor is 1, implying aperiodicity. Being
irreducible and aperiodic, A is primitive by [38, Theorem 1.4]. Since the sum of
every row is 1, the spectral radius is 1.
According to the Perron–Frobenius theorem for primitive matrices [38, The-
orem 1.1], the absolute values of all eigenvalues except one eigenvalue of 1 are
strictly less than 1. The eigenvalue 1 has unique right and left eigenvectors,
up to a constant factor. Both these eigenvectors are strictly positive. There-
fore, [38, Theorem 1.2] implies that limt→∞At = ~1~v′, where ~v′ is the left eigen-
vector of the value 1, normalized such that ~v′~1 = 1, and the approach rate
is geometric. Therefore, we obtain limt→∞ ~p(t) = limt→∞At~p(0) = ~1~v′~p(0) =
~1
∑
(i,j)∈E v
′((i, j))ki. Thus, actions converge to ~1 times
∑
(i,j)∈E v
′((i, j))ki.
To find this limit, consider the vector v′ defined by v′((i, j)) = 1ri+r′i . Sub-
stitution shows it is a left eigenvector of A. To normalize it such that ~v′~1 = 1,
divide this vector by the sum of its coordinates, which is
∑
i∈N
d(i)
ri+r′i
, obtaining
v′((i, j)) = 1∑
i∈N
d(i)
ri+r
′
i
· 1ri+r′i . Therefore, the common limit is
∑
i∈N
(
d(i)
ri+r
′
i
·ki
)
∑
i∈N
(
d(i)
ri+r
′
i
) .
We now prove the case where at least one agent employs fixed reciprocation.
We define the dynamics matrix A analogously to the previous case, besides that
the first line from Eq. (7) is missing for the fixed agents, since for them, own
behavior does not matter. In this case, we have ~p(t+ 1) = A~p(t) + ~k′, where ~k′
is the relevant kindness vector, formally defined as
k′((i, j)) ∆=
{
(1− ri − r′i)ki if i is fixed ;
0 otherwise.
By induction, we obtain ~p(t) = At~p(0) +
(∑t−1
l=0 A
l
)
~k′.
Analogically to the previous case, A is irreducible and non-negative. As
shown above, A is aperiodic, and therefore, primitive. Since at least one agent
employs fixed reciprocation, at least one row of A sums to less than 1, and
therefore the spectral radius of A is strictly less than 1.
Now, the Perron–Frobenius implies that all the eigenvalues are strictly
smaller than 1. Since we have limt→∞ ~p(t) = limt→∞At~p(0) +(
limt→∞
∑t−1
l=0 A
l
)
~k′, [38, Theorem 1.2] implies that this limits exist (the
first part converges to zero, while the second one is a series of geometrically
decreasing elements.) Since A is primitive,
(
limt→∞
∑t−1
l=0 A
l
)
> 0.
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When all the fixed agents have the same kindness k, we now find the limits.
Taking the limits in the equality ~p(t+1) = A~p(t)+~k′ yields (I−A) limt→∞ ~p(t) =
~k′. [38, Lemma B.1] implies that I − A is invertible and therefore, if we guess
a vector ~x that fulfills (I −A)~x = ~k′, it will be the limit. Since the vector with
all actions equal to k satisfies this equation, we conclude that all the limits are
equal to k. In any case, when there exists at least one fixed agent, changing
only the kindness of the floating agents will not change the (unique) solution of
(I −A)~x = ~k′, and, therefore, will not change the limits.
Let us consider several examples of Eq. (6).
Example 3. If the interaction graph is regular, meaning that all the degrees are
equal to each other, we have L =
∑
i∈N
(
ki
ri+r
′
i
)
∑
i∈N
(
1
ri+r
′
i
) . This holds for cliques, modeling
small human collectives or groups of countries, and for cycles, modeling circular
computer networks.
Example 4. For star networks, modeling networks of a supervisor of several
people or entities, assume w.l.o.g. that agent 1 is the center, and we have L =
n−1
r1+r
′
1
·k1+
∑
i∈N\{1}
(
ki
ri+r
′
i
)
n−1
r1+r
′
1
+
∑
i∈N\{1}
(
1
ri+r
′
i
) .
An obvious conclusion of the theorem is that the fixed agents are, intuitively
spoken, more important than the floating ones, at least their kindness is. We
now conclude about the optimal reciprocation, which goes back to providing
decision support.
Proposition 5. If Eq. (6) holds, then agent i who wants to maximize the com-
mon value L, and who can choose either ri or r
′
i, in certain limits [a, b], for
a > 0, should choose either the smallest possible or the largest possible coef-
ficient, as follows. We assume we choose ri, but the same holds for r
′
i with
the obvious adjustments. She should set ri to b, if
∑
j∈N\{i}
(
d(j)
rj+r′j
· kj
)
−
ki
(∑
j∈N\{i}
(
d(j)
rj+r′j
))
is positive, to a, if that is negative, and to an arbitrary,
if zero. When this expression is not zero, only these choices are optimal.
The proof considers the sign of the derivative, and is omitted due to lack of
space.
6 Simulations
We now answer some theoretically unanswered questions from Section 5 us-
ing MatLab simulations, running at least 100 synchronous rounds, to achieve
practical convergence.
We first concentrate on the case of three agents who can influence each other,
meaning that the interaction graph is a clique. We begin by corroborating the
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already proven result that when at least one fixed agents exists, then the kind-
ness of the floating agents does not influence the actions in the limit. Another
proven thing we corroborate is that when exactly one fixed agent exists, then all
the actions approach her kindness as time approaches infinity. When the actions
are plotted as functions of time, we obtain graphs such as those in Figure 4.
The left graph on that figure demonstrates, that exponential convergence may
be quite slow, and this is a new observation we did not know from the theory.
We also corroborate that the limiting values of the actions depend linearly on
the kindness values of all the fixed agents, the proportionality coefficients being
independent of the other kindness values. In order to reasonably cover the sam-
pling space, all the above mentioned regularities have also been automatically
checked for the combinations of kindness values of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, over ri and r
′
i
values of 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and over all the relevant reciprocation attitudes.
The checks were up to the absolute precision of 0.01.
We do not know the exact limits when there exist two or more fixed agents
with distinct kindness values. We at least know that the dependencies on the
kindness values are linear, but we lack theoretical knowledge about the depen-
dencies of the limits of actions on the reciprocation coefficients, so we simulate
the interaction for various reciprocation coefficients, obtaining graphs like those
in Figure 5, and analogously for the dependency on r′1. Note that we can have
both increasing and decreasing graphs in the same scenario, and also convex
and concave graphs. The observed monotonicity was automatically verified for
all the above mentioned combinations of parameters. This monotonicity means
that if an agent wants to maximize the limit of the actions of some agent on
some other agent, she can do this by choosing an extreme value of ri or r
′
i.
The next thing we study is a fourth agent, interacting with some of the
other agents. We consider the limits of the actions as functions of the fourth
agent’s degree, but we found no regularity in these graphs; in particular, no
monotonicity holds in the general case.
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Figure 4: Simulation results for the synchronous case, with one fixed and two
floating agents, for r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0.1, r3 = 0.1, r
′
1 = 0.5, r
′
2 = 0.1, r
′
3 = 0.1.
In the left graph, k1 = 1, k2 = 1, k3 = 2, while in the right one, k1 = 3, k2 =
1, k3 = 5. The common limits, which are equal to the kindness of agent 1, fit
the prediction of Theorem 6.
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Figure 5: Simulation results for the synchronous case, where the limits of actions
are plotted as functions of r1, for r2 = 0.1, r3 = 0.6, r
′
1 = 0.1, r
′
2 = 0.4, r
′
3 = 0.1,
k1 = 3, k2 = 1, k3 = 5. In the left graph, agent 1 and 2 are the only fixed agents,
while in the right one, 1 is the only floating agent. All the graphs exhibit
monotonicity.
7 Additional Notes
When defining a reciprocating reaction, we used the last action of the other
agent to model the opinion about the other agent. We can explicitly define
the opinion of agent i about another agent j at time t, opini,j : Rt+1 → R, as
opini,j(t)
∆
= actj,i(sj(t)), upon i. Then, we obtain that in the fixed reciprocation
attitude for t > 0, acti,j(t)
∆
= (1− ri − r′i) · ki + ri · opini,j(t− 1) + r′i · goti(t−1)|N(i)| .
and in the floating reciprocation attitude for t > 0, acti,j(t)
∆
= (1 − ri − r′i) ·
acti,j(si(t− 1)) + ri · opini,j(t− 1)
+ r′i · goti(t−1)|N(i)| .
Naturally, a more general definition of opinion is possible. To this end, we
define the temporal distance in Ti, for an i ∈ N , which designates how many
times agent i acted between two given times in Ti. Formally, for an i ∈ N and
two times ti,l, ti,m ∈ Ti, we define dTi : T 2i → R+ by dTi(ti,l, ti,m) ∆= |l −m|.
Now, define the cumulative opinion of i about j at time t to be opini,j(t)
∆
=∑
t′∈Tj ,t′≤t δi(dTj (t
′, sj(t)) + 1) · actj,i(t′), where δi(p) : R+ → R+ is the dis-
count function, expressing how much the passed time influences the importance
of an action.
Our definition of opinion as opini,j(t) = actj,i(sj(t)) is a particular case of
this model, where the discount function is δi(p) =
{
1 p = 1,
0 otherwise.
8 Related Work
In addition to the direct motivation for our model, presented in Section 1, we
were inspired by Trivers [41] (a psychologist), who describes a balance between
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an inner quality (immutable kindness) and costs/benefits when determining an
action. This idea of balancing the inner and the outer appears also in our
model.
The idea of humans behaving according to a convex combination resembles
another model, that of the altruistic extension, like [10, 23, 31], and Chapter iii.2
in [25]. In these papers, utility is often assumed being a convex combination,
while we consider a mechanism of an action being a convex combination.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
In order to facilitate behavioral decisions regarding reciprocation, we need to
predict what interaction a given setting will engender. To this end, we model
two reciprocation attitudes where a reaction is a weighted combination of the
action of the other player, the total action of the neighborhood and either one’s
own kindness or one’s own last action. For a pairwise interaction, we show
that actions converge, find the exact limits, and show that if you consider your
kindness while reciprocating (fixed), then, asymptotically, your actions values
get closer to your kindness than if you consider it only at the outset. For a
general network, we prove convergence and find the common limit if all agents
act synchronously and consider their last own action (floating), besides at most
one agent. Dealing with the case when multiple agents consider their kindness
(fixed) is mathematically hard, so we use simulations.
In Example 1 with the parameters from the end of Section 2, (all the
agents employ floating reciprocation), Eq. (6) implies that all the actions ap-
proach 25/52 in the limit, meaning that all the colleagues support each other
emotionally a lot.
In addition to predicting the development of reciprocal interactions, our re-
sults explain why persistent agents have more influence on the interaction. An
expression of the converged behavior is that while growing up, people acquire
their own style of reciprocating with acquaintances [32]. In organizations, many
styles are often very similar from person to person, forming organizational cul-
tures [24].
We saw in theory and we know from everyday life that the reciprocation
process may seem confusing, but the exponential convergence promises the con-
fusion to be short. Actually, we can have a not so quick exponential convergence,
such as observed in the left graph in Figure 4, but mostly, the process converges
quickly. Another important conclusion is that employing floating reciprocation
makes us achieve equality. In the synchronous case, to achieve a common limit
it is also enough for all the fixed agents to have the same kindness. We also show
that if all agents employ floating reciprocation and act synchronously, then the
influence of an agent is proportional to her number of neighbors and inversely
proportional to her tendency to reciprocate, that is, the stability. We prove that
in the synchronous case, the limit is either a linear combination of the kindnesses
of all the fixed agents or, if all the agents are floating, a linear combination of
the kindnesses of all the agents. Thus, an agent’s kindness influences nothing,
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or it is a linear factor, thereby enabling a very eager agent to influence the limits
arbitrarily, by having the fixed attitude and the appropriate kindness.
As we see in examples, real situations may require more complex modeling,
motivating further research.For instance, modeling interactions with a known
finite time horizon would be interesting. Since people may change while recip-
rocating, modeling changes in the reciprocity coefficients and/or reciprocation
attitude is important. In addition, groups of colleagues and nations get and
lose people, motivating modeling a dynamically changing set of reciprocating
agents. Even with the same set of agents, the interaction graph may change
as people move around. We study interaction processes where agents recipro-
cate with some given parameters, and show that maximizing L would require
extreme values of reciprocation coefficients. To predict real situations better
and to be able to give constructive advice about what parameters and attitudes
of the agents are useful, we should define utility functions to the agents and
consider the game where agents choose their own parameters before the inter-
action commences. This is hard, but people are able to change their behavior.
Considering how to influence agents to change their behavior is also relevant.
Though it seems extremely hard, it would be nice to consider our model in the
light of a game theoretic model of an extensive form game, such as [14]. We used
others’ research, based on real data, as a basis for the model; actually evaluating
the model on relevant data, like the arms race actions, may be enlightening. An
agent could have different kindness values towards different agents, to represent
her prejudgement. Another extension would be allowing the same action be
perceived differently by various agents. A system of agents who have both a
fixed and a floating component would be interesting to analyze.
Analytical and simulations analysis of reciprocation process allows estimat-
ing whether an interaction will be profitable to a given agent and lays the foun-
dation for further modeling and analysis of reciprocation, in order to anticipate
and improve the individual utilities and the social welfare.
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